Research and Interests

Research Areas of Interest: Semi-Markov Models, Survival Analysis, Mathematical Modeling

Most of my recent research has been with the Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics (ORES) of the Social Security Administration. We have developed age-dependent semi-markov models of the work patterns of the disabled. I am now using survival analysis techniques to analyze the factors which help disabled beneficiaries to go back to work and stay working. The data comes from the New Beneficiary Followup Survey which is available from the ORES site. You can read about the survey from their homepage.

Next year, I will be on sabbatical at ORES working on the evaluation methodology for the Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. The summary is listed below:

Social Security Legislative Bulletin

December 17, 1999

President Clinton Signs The Ticket To Work And Work Incentives Improvement Act Of 1999

Today the President signed into law H.R. 1180, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. The law contains the following provisions of interest to SSA:

Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program

General

Directs the Commissioner to establish a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency program (Program) which would provide SSDI and SSI disability beneficiaries with a ticket they may use to obtain vocational rehabilitation (VR) services, employment services, and other support services from an employment network of their choice.

Demonstration Projects and Studies

Reduction in Disability Benefits Based on Earnings

Directs the Commissioner to conduct demonstration projects to evaluate the effects of a $1 for $2 withholding of SSDI payments for earnings over a level specified by the Commissioner.
Provides that the demonstration projects should determine:
- the effects, if any, of induced entry and reduced exit;
- the extent, if any, to which the project being tested is affected by whether it is being conducted in a locality within an area under the administration of the Ticket Program; and,
- the savings to the Trust Funds and other Federal programs as a result of the project.
Requires the Commissioner to determine the annual cost, the reasons for the return to work of beneficiaries who participate in the project, and the employment outcomes of beneficiaries who return to work as a result of participation in the project.
Permits the Commissioner to evaluate the merits of the trial work period and the period of extended eligibility as part of the projects.
Authorizes the Commissioner to waive compliance with the title II benefit provisions and the Secretary of HHS to waive compliance with the benefit requirements of title XVIII, insofar as is necessary for a thorough evaluation of the alternative methods under consideration.

The abstract for my latest article in the Social Security Bulletin:

Factors Affecting the Work Efforts of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries, Social Security Bulletin, No. 3, 97(60), 3 - 20

Congress is currently placing considerable emphasis on returning disabled-worker beneficiaries to work. However, going back to work is only the first step in the complex process of program termination due to work and trust fund savings. Not only must the beneficiary get a job, but also the work effort must be sustained at what is considered a substantial gainful activity (SGA) level by the disability program (so that an SGA termination will result) and a reasonable living condition must be achieved by the beneficiary (so that the person is motivated to continue working and lose benefits). This article focuses on those factors that affect the ability of the beneficiary to sustain such a work effort. Combined with previous findings about returning to work, we begin to see the overall effect of the factors on work efforts.

Beneficiaries who have physical therapy rehabilitation have a higher tendency to start working and a lower tendency to stop. Those with vocational training or general education have a higher tendency to start working, but these factors do not help to sustain the effort. Beneficiaries who were helped with job placement have a higher tendency to start work, but they also have a higher tendency to stop. If beneficiaries knew about the trial-work period but not about either the extended period of eligibility or Medicare continuation, then they had a higher tendency to start work and a higher tendency to stop. However, if they knew about all three work incentive provisions, then the tendency to work was not affected.

(This work uses Cox proportional hazard models with time-dependent covariates to perform the analysis.)

Earlier Work:

Job Patterns of Disabled Beneficiaries, Social Security Bulletin, Winter, 96(59), 3 - 11
Comparison of Individual Characteristics and Death Rates of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries Entitled in 1972 and 1985, with Janice M. Dykacz, Social Security Bulletin, Fall 92(55), 24 - 40
A Comparison of the Recovery Rates of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries Entitled in 1972 and 1985, with Janice M. Dykacz, Social Security Bulletin, Summer 93,(56), 58 - 69
Postrecovery Experience of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries, with Janice M. Dykacz, Social Security Bulletin, Summer 89(52), 42 - 66
Projected Outcomes and Length of Time in the Disability Insurance Program, with Janice M. Dykacz, Social Security Bulletin, Summer 89(52), 2 - 41
The Effect of Vocational Rehabilitation and Work Incentives on Helping the Disabled-Worker Beneficiary Back to Work, with L. Scott Muller, Social Security Bulletin, Spring 95(58), 15 - 28
Work Efforts of Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries: Preliminary Findings from the New Beneficiary Followup Survey, with L. Scott Muller, Social Security Bulletin, Fall 94(57), 42 - 51
Medicare Costs Prior to Retirement for Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries, with Barry Bye, Janice Dykacz, and Gerald Riley, Social Security Bulletin, April 91(54), 2 - 23